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THE  FILIÈRE INTEGRÉE—AN AFRICAN 
SUCCESS STORY: Cotton production is an important 
smallholder export crop for Africa in general and for 
Francophone WCA in particular. From independence to 
the mid-1990s, the filière integrée approach to cotton 
sector organization in Francophone WCA was cited in 
the development literature as a success story. The 
defining characteristic of the filière integrée is the single-
channel relationship between producers and a monopoly 
cotton company that vertically integrates the diverse 
functions associated with cotton production, processing, 
and exporting. The vertical integration facilitates the task 
of providing input credit and encourages investments in 
research and extension services needed to foster 
intensive cropping practices and high yields. At 
independence, the vertically integrated structures 
introduced by the French were maintained relatively 
intact, with the only change occurring in the 1970s 
through a switch from a monopoly managed by the 
Compagnie française pour le développement des fibres 
textiles (CFDT) to national monopolies managed by a 
public-private partnership between the CFDT (currently 
operating as Geocoton) and each national government,  
with the latter holding the majority shares. This approach 
successfully: 
 provided access to extension services, inputs, and 
credit (with high repayment rates) for a broad range of 
farmers; the result was generalized increases in yields 
and incomes that contributed to poverty reduction;  
 helped create farmer organizations and build their 
capacity;  
 guaranteed an output market and stable cotton prices, 
hence reliable incomes for farmers;  
 developed effective technical packages through 
regional sharing of research;  
 created jobs both upstream (input supply and 
extension) and downstream (ginning);  
 supplied tax revenues to support national budgets; and, 
in some cases  
 invested in economic and social infrastructure in the 
cotton producing zones. 
  The performance was impressive, with yields 
quadrupling or quintupling from the 1950s through the 
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mid-1980s in most WCA countries. While the famous 
“Berg” report published by the World Bank in 1981
1 was 
generally critical of Africa’s poorly managed agricultural 
marketing boards and parastatals (using the cotton 
sectors in Tanzania and Nigeria as illustrations of 
problem systems), the same report praised the cotton 
sectors in Mali and Burkina Faso, pointing out that the 
filière integrée approach contributed to the success of 
two major World Bank projects during the 1970s. 
RECURRENT CRISES LEAD TO EARLY 
CALLS FOR REFORM: WCA cotton sectors have 
experienced repeated periods of crisis since the mid-
1980s (1985, 1992, 1998, and 2004, for example) 
characterized by sector-wide deficits that frequently 
required government and/or donor bailouts.
2  While 
each crisis was triggered by declining world prices, 
often exacerbated by overvalued exchange rates
3 and 
changes in cotton support programs of the more 
industrialized countries, some analysts argue that the 
WCA cotton sector organizational model became a 
victim of its own success.
4 The phenomenal growth up 
through the early 1990s made it increasingly difficult 
to manage the sector, control costs, and develop the 
administrative flexibility needed to respond to 
increasingly complex and volatile world markets. As 
the national economies in WCA became more 
dependent on the cotton sector, cotton sector decision 
making became increasingly politicized.  Decisions by 
governments and by cotton companies frequently 
                                                 
1 Aid to African Agriculture: Lessons from Two Decades of 
Donors’ Experience edited by Uma Lele (1991, Johns Hopkins 
University Press) also found the WCA cotton systems’ integrated 
approach more successful than others. 
2 In the late 1980s two-thirds of the producer organizations in 
Burkina Faso were in default on input credit payments which were 
eventually covered by government when reforms were initiated in 
1992. In Mali, the sector incurred a 9 billion CFA franc deficit in 
1985/86 credited largely to the combined effect of falling world 
prices and the growing cost of the CMDT’s cotton production and 
rural development activities, which tended to be much broader than 
those undertaken in other WCA cotton systems. The sector broke 
even the next two seasons following reforms that included more 
rigorous financial management, subcontracting part of seed cotton 
and lint transport to the private sector, increased CMDT 
responsibility for export marketing, freezing producer prices and 
reducing input subsidies (Tefft 2004).  Despite these short spurts of 
improvements, there has not been sustained growth in farmer 
productivity or a sustained reduction in post-harvest costs; 
Government and donors had to intervene again to bail out the 
Malian cotton sector in 1992/93 and several times since 2001. 
3 Exchange rate movements cushioned the system after the 1994 
CFA franc devaluation and again in 2002 (because the US dollar 
was appreciating against the Euro); but the impact since 2002 has 
been generally unfavorable due to appreciation of the Euro.   
4 This view is expressed explicitly in Tschirley et al. (forthcoming) 
and reinforced by many of the managerial weaknesses described in 
Baghdadli et al. 2007. 
became indistinguishable and were often driven by 
short-term political considerations rather than by the 
need to ensure long-term sector sustainability. In some 
cases, politicians were tempted to extract resources 
from cotton companies during boom years, either to 
finance public expenditures or for private gain. At the 
same time, cotton farmers and cotton companies 
gained economic and political weight increasing their 
ability to influence government decisions concerning 
producer prices and cotton sector bail outs. 
Functioning in this politically driven atmosphere, the 
companies failed to adopt the more sophisticated 
management tools required for running their 
increasingly large and complex enterprises.
5 The result 
was rising costs due to inefficiencies and lax 
management control that gradually eroded the WCA 
competitive advantage in cotton.
  
Some concrete illustrations of the consequences of 
weak management and political influence in the face of 
rapid growth include (1) low prices received by 
producers, even after accounting for marketing costs; 
(2) inflexibility of the panterritorial pricing 
mechanism, which transferred resources from efficient 
producers to inefficient ones–in effect playing the role 
of a poorly designed poverty reduction strategy; (3) 
mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds by 
the cotton companies, which in the name of price 
stabilization objectives taxed producers in periods of 
high prices only to be unable to compensate them in 
periods of low prices; (4) inflexibility of the input 
supply mechanisms, which discouraged diversification 
to other crops; (5) low farm profitability due to 
stagnating yields and low processing profitability due 
to inefficiencies in post-harvest operations (Baghdadli 
et al. 2007). 
Most countries were aware of these managerial 
weaknesses and several began reform programs in the 
mid-1980s by introducing performance contracts 
negotiated between the state and the cotton company. 
The overall objective was to make cotton companies 
more accountable to government and stakeholders by 
specifying in advance company responsibilities and 
production targets. In practice, the contracts (used in 
Mali, Burkina Faso and Cameroon) proved difficult to 
monitor and failed to deliver any significant and long-
lasting improvements. Cotton companies were 
reluctant to provide information to government, argued 
that changes in the overall economy justified their poor 
                                                 
5 Burkina’s SOFITEX and Mali’s CMDT, for example, are the 
largest cotton companies in Africa, having experienced very rapid 
growth during the 1980s and early 1990s. This growth presented 
numerous management challenges.   3
performance, and still turned to the government to 
cover their losses.  
CALLS FOR FURTHER REFORM: While 
recognizing the many benefits of the vertically 
integrated filière systems, many cotton sector analysts 
came to believe that the costs of relying on a monopoly 
structure (single firm) to maintain vertical integration 
throughout the sector were outweighing the benefits. 
Discussions about cotton sector reform heated up in the 
late 1990s, but the pressure became greater in 2004 
when three countries (Benin, Mali, and Burkina) had 
sizeable deficits and were unable to pay farmers 
because of depleted stabilization funds. This forced 
governments to request World Bank support, which 
led, in turn, to pressure from the international financial 
institutions and bilateral donors for more substantive 
reforms of the filière integrée model.  
Advocates of more reform tended to focus on structural 
issues (the need to increase competition) and the role 
of government (withdrawal from tasks that can, in 
principle, be accomplished by the private sector). To 
move the agenda forward, advocates noted that a wide 
range of cotton sector issues had to be addressed 
(Badiane et al. 2002).  Activities proposed in support 
of structural reform included: 
 allowing free entry and competition at all levels;  
 allowing producer prices to reflect world prices 
while protecting stakeholders against price risks; 
Supporting activities needed to reduce the role of 
government included: 
 developing private-sector mechanisms to ensure 
credit recovery; 
 building producer association capacity for managing 
input supply, technical services and contract 
farming; 
 establishing trade associations to enhance private 
sector coordination and financing of sector-wide 
technical support services; and 
 improving the provision of services, especially 
research, extension, and phytosanitary controls, 
where governments have a role in financing the 
public goods
6 component. 
In most of the region there is a strong belief among 
local stakeholders that the single-channel relationship 
between producers and the cotton companies is 
necessary to ensure a sustainable input credit system 
and to guarantee intensive cropping practices.  Support 
                                                 
6 Public goods are goods (or services) that can be used by one 
person without affecting the supply to other people.  Once public 
goods are available, no one can be stopped from consuming them 
for free. (e.g., public roads, agricultural market information). It is 
impractical for the private sector to supply a public good. 
for the single-channel system considerably reduced the 
options for reform, resulting in a variety of incremental 
changes brought to the existing single-channel model. 
These changes pertained mainly to (1) further 
development of farmer associations and their increased 
involvement in the delivery of critical 
services/functions, (2) the entry of private actors in 
ginning or input supply activities (Benin, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso), (3) the tentative and often 
partial withdrawal of government from the 
management of the cotton sector and the parallel 
empowerment of cotton sector “inter-professional 
committees” (Burkina and Benin), and (4) the 
introduction of producer price-setting mechanisms to 
ensure a better linkage to world prices.  
THEORETICAL VS. EMPIRICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF REFORMS: To date, the types, 
magnitude, pace, and impacts of the reforms 
implemented in WCA have differed across countries, 
as has the enthusiasm for the process among 
government decision makers and subsector 
stakeholders. Mali, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, and Chad, for example, continue to operate 
vertically integrated government-run monopoly sectors 
despite government commitments to privatize.
7 Benin 
and Burkina Faso have allowed new firms to enter the 
seed cotton purchasing and ginning sectors, but 
competition among these firms is suppressed by 
various rules and zoning decisions. For many cotton 
sector stakeholders, the underlying arguments for 
radically changing the structure of the sector appear to 
be founded on theoretical precepts rather than the 
realities of their national economies, the vagaries of the 
international market place, and the empirical record of 
cotton sector development in WCA and elsewhere in 
the world.
8  
A common argument against privatization and 
liberalization efforts is that in reality they have focused 
almost exclusively on measuring performance in terms 
of prices (for example, the share of the world cotton 
price paid to farmers) without paying adequate 
attention to the very long list of farmer concerns that 
had   been   addressed   progressively   from  the 1950s  
                                                 
7 There have, however, been some modifications in the provision of 
transport services where the private sector is now active. Also, in 
August 2008 Mali passed an act authorizing the privatization of its 
cotton company (CMDT). 
8 This sentiment was strongly reinforced by changes in US cotton 
subsidies, considered the impetus for the U.S.’s share of world 
cotton exports growing from 17% in 1998 to 42% in 2003.  This 
increase in exports has contributed to the decline in world cotton 
prices observed since the late 1990s and elicited the WTO 
complaints filed by Brazil and C-4 cotton producers.   4
through the 1990s by the filière integrée approach (Fok 
and Tazi 2003): 
 Risk (addressed through early announcement of 
prices and guaranteed markets); 
 Input access (addressed through sector-wide credit 
and delivery systems, relying on farmers 
associations to guarantee credit and ensure against 
abuses such as late delivery and poor quality); 
 Input prices (use of subsidies at appropriate times to 
stimulate adoption of traction equipment, fertilizers, 
and insecticides); 
 Output prices (progressive involvement of farmer 
associations in price negotiations that take 
production costs into consideration); 
 Financial liquidity (generally rapid payment of 
farmers after cotton has been collected); 
 Improving farmers’ technical competence 
(development of mechanisms to fund extension 
services and research from sector revenues) 
 Improving farmers’ organizational and 
representational competence (through capacity 
building of farmer organizations at local, regional, 
national, and international levels); and 
 Infrastructure development using cotton revenues to 
build roads, schools, and health care facilities. 
The argument is that there is a risk in the more 
“competitive” sectors for the relationships and 
confidence that had been so carefully nurtured among 
the various actors in the filière integrée approach to 
weaken or disappear; this permits the growth of 
relationships based on brutal competition and provides 
few if any incentives for different actors to work 
together for the overall survival of the sector. 
UNDERSTANDING THE EMPIRICAL RECORD: 
The purpose of the series of Policy Briefs introduced 
by this brief is to provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between cotton sector structure and 
performance by drawing on the empirical record of 
cotton sector reforms across the African continent. It is 
hoped that by having easy access to information on 
reforms elsewhere, stakeholders in the WCA cotton 
reform process will be in a better position to assess 
their own progress, compare it to that of others, and 
improve the outcomes.  
The next PB in the series (No. 2) presents a broad 
overview of structure-performance links using nine 
performance criteria:  producer prices, net farm returns, 
access to inputs and credit repayment rates, number of 
new cotton varieties adopted during the past ten years, 
cotton yield trends, lint quality, cost-efficiency of post-
harvest operations, value added, and macroeconomic 
budgetary impacts. Empirical evidence for the analysis 
of these structure-performance links comes from seven 
country case studies: Mali, Benin, Cameroon, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.  
Subsequent PB will look at single problematic or 
controversial topics such as input supply and credit or 
pricing mechanisms. These subsequent PB will provide 
fuller descriptions of the different approaches taken to 
resolving the problems than that presented in the 
overview of PB No. 2. 
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